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We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a con-
sumer’s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods, such as quality
or price. An attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the
good’s attributes relative to that attribute’s average level in the choice
set ðor, more broadly, the choice contextÞ. Consumers attach dispropor-
tionately high weight to salient attributes, and their choices are tilted
toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts for
a variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects and context-
dependent willingness to pay. It also suggests a novel theory of mislead-
ing sales.
I. Introduction
Imagine yourself in a wine store, choosing a red wine. You are consid-
ering a French syrah from the Rhone Valley, selling for $20 a bottle, and
an Australian shiraz, made from the same grape, selling for $10. You
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know and like French syrah better; you think it is perhaps 50 percent
better. Yet it sells for twice as much. After some thought, you decide the
Australian shiraz is a better bargain and buy a bottle.
A few weeks later, you are at a restaurant, and you see the same two
wines on the wine list. Yet both of them are marked up by $40, with the
French syrah selling for $60 a bottle and the Australian shiraz for $50.
You again think the French wine is 50 percent better, but now it is only
20 percent more expensive. At the restaurant, it is a better deal. You
splurge and order the French wine.
This example illustrates what perhaps has happened to many of us,
namely, thinking in context and ﬁguring out which of several choices
represents a better deal in light of the options we face. In this paper, we
try to formalize the intuition behind such thinking. The intuition gen-
eralizes what we believe goes through a consumer’s mind in the wine ex-
ample: at the store, the price difference between the cheaper and the
more expensive wine is more salient than the quality difference, encour-
aging the consumer to opt for the cheaper option, whereas at the restau-
rant, after the markups, the quality difference is more salient, encourag-
ing the consumer to splurge. We argue that this kind of thinking reﬂects
a fundamental feature of decision making, namely, that the consumer’s
attention is drawn to—and his choice is shaped by—the most salient as-
pects in the choice context he faces. We present a parsimonious model
of salience in decision making for riskless choice and show how it helps
account for and unify a broad range of disparate thought experiments,
ﬁeld experiments, and even ﬁeld data that have been difﬁcult to account
for in standard models, and certainly in one model.
Consider a few examples. A car buyer would prefer to pay $17,500 for a
car equipped with a radio to paying $17,000 for a car without a radio but
at the same time would not buy a radio separately for $500 after agree-
ing to buy a car for $17,000 ðSavage 1954Þ. In a related vein, experimental
subjects thinking of buying a calculator for $15 and a jacket for $125 are
more likely to agree to travel for 10 minutes to save $5 on the calculator
than to travel the same 10 minutes to save $5 on the jacket ðKahneman
and Tversky 1984; Kahneman 2011Þ.
When faced with a choice between a good toaster for $20 and a
somewhat better one for $30, most experimental subjects choose the
cheaper toaster. But when a marginally superior toaster is added to the
choice set for $50, these subjects switch to the middle toaster, violating
the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, IIA ðTversky and
Simonson 1993Þ.
Imagine sunbathing with a friend on a beach in Mexico. It is hot, and
your friend offers to get you an ice-cold Corona from the nearest place,
which is 100 yards away. He asks for your reservation price. In the ﬁrst
treatment, the nearest place to buy the beer is a beach resort. In the sec-
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ond treatment, the nearest place is a corner store. Many people would pay
more for a beer from a resort than for one from the store, contradicting
the fundamental assumption that willingness to pay for a good is inde-
pendent of context ðThaler 1985, 1999Þ.
When gasoline prices rise, many people switch from higher- to lower-
grade gasoline, to an extent that is hard to account for through income
effects ðHastings and Shapiro 2013Þ.
Stores often post extremely high regular prices for goods but then
immediately put themon sale at substantial discounts. The original prices
and percentage discounts are displayed prominently for consumers. In
some department stores, more than half the revenues come from sales
ðOrtmeyer, Quelch, and Salmon 1991Þ.
We suggest that these and several other phenomena can be explained
in a uniﬁed way using a model of salience in decision making. As de-
scribed by psychologists Taylor and Thompson ð1982, 175Þ, “salience
refers to the phenomenon that when one’s attention is differentially di-
rected to one portion on the environment rather than to others, the in-
formation contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weigh-
ing in subsequent judgments.” Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer ð2012Þ
apply this idea to decisions under risk and present a model in which de-
cision makers overweigh salient lottery states. They ﬁnd that many
anomalies in choice under risk, such as frequent risk-seeking behavior,
Allais paradoxes, and preference reversals, obtain naturally when salience
inﬂuences decision weights. We follow Bordalo et al. in stressing the in-
terplay of attention and choice and extend the concept of salience to
riskless choice among goods with different attributes, which may include
various aspects of quality but also prices. We then describe decision mak-
ing by a consumer who overweighs in his choices the most salient attri-
butes of each good he considers, and we show that many of the phenom-
ena just described, as well as several others, obtain naturally in such a
model.
In our model, a good’s salient attributes are those that stand out or are
unusual in the sense of being furthest from those of the “reference
good.” In the basic version of the model, the reference good is deﬁned as
having the average level of each attribute, where the average is taken over
the goods in the choice set. The consumer’s attention is drawn to the
salient attributes, which are then overweighted in his choice. In many
situations, salience induces consumers to focus on the relative advantage
of goods having a high quality to price ratio. The model thus delivers the
fundamental intuition that buyers look for bargains, whether expressed in
high quality ðrelative to priceÞ or low prices ðrelative to qualityÞ.
The salience mechanism generates context effects. The quality/price
ratio logic implies that consumers display higher price sensitivity, mean-
ing a steeper trade-off between quality and price, at low price levels. The
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model also provides new insights into the effects of adding to the choice
set “decoy” goods with low quality/price ratios. We ﬁnd that such decoys
asymmetrically boost the demand for high-, but not for low-, quality op-
tions.
We then extend the model to allow the reference good to also depend
on the rationally expected prices of the goods in the choice set. In
Thaler’s ð1985Þ beer example, the sunbather expects the beer price at
the store to be the usual store beer price and the beer price at the resort
to be the usual resort beer price. In Hastings and Shapiro’s ð2013Þ gas-
oline example, buyers approach the gas station having in mind rational
expectations of gasoline prices. The model predicts strong reactions
to unexpected price increases, which make prices more likely to become
salient. It also generates a context-dependent willingness to pay through
an anchoring-like mechanism.1
Context dependence created by salience leads to the central empirical
implications of the model. In broad terms, consumers in our model be-
come relatively insensitive to price differences between goods of different
qualities when faced with an expected uniform increase in prices. In
contrast, consumers are very price sensitive when faced with an unex-
pected uniform price increase. These central implications are summa-
rized in proposition 5 in Section IV.
Economists have tried several approaches to account for some of the
experimental evidence we discuss here: the standard analysis of context
effects is information-theoretic ðWernerfelt 1995; Kamenica 2008Þ, while
many behavioral models, which we review in Section II.B, emphasize the
dependence of choice on external reference points ðKahneman and
Tverksy 1979; Simonson and Tversky 1992Þ. The present model offers
several advantages. It provides a tractable framework for a fundamental
psychological mechanism, based on ex post attention allocation to well-
deﬁned salient features of the environment. It accounts for a broad
range of context-dependent choices, both in riskless environments and
in choice under risk ðBordalo et al. 2012Þ. It provides new insight into
how reference points shape valuation and, as a result, can account for
evidence that is dumbfounding from the standard perspective, such as
Thaler’s beer example. More generally, the model’s distinctive predic-
tions offer new insights into puzzling evidence in several applications.
Finally, the model generates falsiﬁable predictions, even when some in-
1 Our approach is related to situations in which decision makers evaluate their options us-
ing mental accounts ðThaler 1980Þ. Recent research on the interplay of attention and choice
includes Mullainathan ð2002Þ, Gennaioli and Shleifer ð2010Þ, Gabaix ð2012Þ, Schwartzstein
ð2012Þ, and Woodford ð2012Þ. The marketing literature also stresses the effect on choice of
the set of alternatives that come to the consumer’s mind ðsee Roberts and Lattin 1997Þ.
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puts of the salience mechanism ðsuch as quality levels or price expecta-
tionsÞ are not fully observable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model when
context is given by the choice set and establishes the central role of the
quality/price ratio in shaping salience and consumer decisions. Sec-
tion III explores the context effects that arise from manipulations of the
choice set, such as changes in price levels and violations of indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives such as decoy and compromise effects.
Section IV broadens the notion of context to include expected prices
and explores its implications for the demand for quality, including the
effects of surprising price changes. Here we show how our model accounts
for context-dependent willingness to pay ðthe Thaler beer exampleÞ. In
Section V, we describe several falsiﬁable predictions of the model. Sec-
tion VI presents a new theory of sales showing how discounts can mislead
consumers. Section VII presents concluding remarks.
II. The Model
A. Setup
Aconsumer evaluates allN > 1 goods in a choice set C; fðqk; pkÞgk51; : : : ;N .
Each good k is characterized by its nonnegative quality qk and price pk ,
and we assume, without loss of generality, that price increases in k ði.e.,
p1 <    < pN Þ.2 Quality and price are measured in dollars and known to
the consumer. We discuss issues concerning the empirical measurement
of quality in Section V. In online Appendix B, we extend the model to
the case of goods having multiple quality attributes.
Without salience distortions, a consumer values good k with a linear
utility function,
uk 5 qk 2 pk; ð1Þ
which attaches equal weights to quality and price. A salient thinker de-
parts from ð1Þ by inﬂating the relative weights attached to the attributes
that he perceives to be more salient. As in Bordalo et al. ð2012Þ, we say
that an attribute ðquality or priceÞ is salient for good k in the choice setC
if this attribute “stands out” relative to the good’s other attributes. For-
mally, denote by ðq; pÞ the reference good consisting of average attri-
butes q ;okqk=N and p ;okpk=N in C. The salience of quality for a
generic good k is then given by jðqk; qÞ, while the salience of price for
2 We think of C as the set of goods available to the consumer. Unless explicitly men-
tioned, this set does not include the outside option of not buying, ð0, 0Þ, which corresponds
to zero quality and zero price. Proposition 3 explores the effects of including such an out-
side option in C.
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good k is given by jðpk; pÞ. To deﬁne the salience function jð; Þ, denote
by ak the level of an attribute ðquality or priceÞ for good k and by a the
attribute’s average level in C. We then have the following deﬁnition.
Definition 1. The salience function jð; Þ is symmetric and con-
tinuous and satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. Ordering. Let m5 sgnðak2 aÞ. Then for any e, e 0 ≥ 0 with e1 e 0 > 0,
we have
jðak 1 me; a 2 me 0Þ > jðak; aÞ: ð2Þ
2. Diminishing sensitivity. For any ak, a ≥ 0 and all e > 0, we have
jðak 1 e; a 1 eÞ < jðak; aÞ: ð3Þ
We say that, in the choice set C, quality is salient for good k when
jðqk; qÞ > jðpk; pÞ, price is salient for good k when jðqk ; qÞ < jðpk; pÞ, and
price and quality are equally salient when jðqk; qÞ5 jðpk; pÞ.
As we discuss in Bordalo et al. ð2012Þ, the properties of deﬁnition 1
capture two key features of sensory perception. First, our perceptive ap-
paratus is attuned to detect changes in stimuli. This is captured by or-
dering, whereby salience increases in contrast: the value ak of an attri-
bute is salient when it is very different from the average value a of the
same attribute in the choice set. For instance, if a good is much more ex-
pensive than average, then its price is very salient. Second, changes in
stimuli are perceived with diminishing sensitivity ðWeber’s lawÞ: formally,
salience decreases as the value of an attribute uniformly increases for all
goods. For instance, the salience of price falls when all prices become
uniformly higher. At higher price levels, given price differences are less
noticeable.
Ordering and diminishing sensitivity interact in determining salience.
Suppose that the price pk of the most expensive good goes up. By order-
ing, pk becomes more salient. At the same time, the increase in pk in-
creases the average price level p. By diminishing sensitivity, this reduces
the salience of pk . When, as in this case, ordering and diminishing sen-
sitivity point in different directions, the trade-off between them is pinned
down by the speciﬁc salience function adopted. Although most of our
results hold under the general deﬁnition 1, in what follows we pin down
this trade-off by assuming that the salience function is homogeneous of
degree zero.
Assumption 1. The salience function satisﬁes ordering and homo-
geneity of degree zero, which is deﬁned as jða  ak;a  a Þ5 jðak; aÞ for
all a > 0.
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Together with ordering, homogeneity of degree zero of the salience
function implies diminishing sensitivity for positive attribute levels,3 so
assumption 1 implies deﬁnition 1 in this range.
Homogeneity of degree zero characterizes salience in an intuitive way:
upon a variation in a good’s attribute ak , ordering dominates diminishing
sensitivity if and only if the change in ak is proportionally larger than the
induced change in the average a. To extend this property to zero attri-
bute levels, we interpret jðak; 0Þ as limz→0 jðak ; zÞ. Moreover, when com-
paring jðqk; 0Þ and jðpk; 0Þ, we take the limit with the ratio of the z terms
constant at 1. As a consequence, jðqk; 0Þ > jðpk; 0Þ if and only if qk > pk ,
so ordering is preserved for all nonnegative attribute levels.
An example of a salience function satisfying homogeneity of degree
zero, which we previously used in Bordalo et al. ð2012Þ, is
jðak; aÞ5 jak 2 ajak 1 a ð4Þ
for ak , a  0, and jð0; 0Þ5 0.4
Homogeneity of degree zero highlights the role of a good’s quality/
price ratio in determining the salience ranking of its attributes. Take a
choice set C consisting of N > 1 goods. We then show the following prop-
osition ðall proofs are in App. AÞ.
Proposition 1. Let ðqk; pkÞ be a good that neither dominates nor
is dominated by the reference good ðq; pÞ, that is, ðqk 2 qÞðpk 2 pÞ > 0.
The following two statements are equivalent:
1. The higher quality or lower price of k relative to ðq; pÞ is salient iff
qk=pk > q=p.
2. Salience is homogeneous of degree zero.
Under assumption 1, salience favors goods with a high quality/price
ratio. Proposition1 captures a central intuitionofourmodel: a gooddeal is
attractive because it draws a consumer’s attention to its advantage ðhigh
quality or low priceÞ relative to its competitors.
3 To see this, is it sufﬁcient to note that ordering and homogeneity of degree zero imply
that salience is an increasing function of the ratio ak=a when ak > a and of the ratio a=ak
when ak < a. Uniform increases in ak and a then reduce salience in the two cases. Ho-
mogeneity of degree zero is stronger than diminishing sensitivity and, in particular, ex-
cludes certain weak forms of the latter. For instance, the salience function jðx; yÞ5
jx 2 yj=ðx 1 y 1 zÞ, with z > 0, satisﬁes deﬁnition 1 but not homogeneity of degree zero ðin
fact, jðax;ayÞ > jðx; yÞ for a > 1Þ.
4 Because the model is deﬁned for nonnegative attribute levels, the speciﬁcation of the
salience function is slightly different from that in Bordalo et al. ð2012Þ: Deﬁnition 1 does
not include a reﬂection property ðfor negative attribute levelsÞ, and the denominator in
eq. ð4Þ does not feature the absolute value of attributes. The model can be extended in a
straightforward way to negative attribute levels.
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To complete the model, consider how salience distorts the valuation
of a good. Given a salience function j, a consumer ranks a good’s attri-
butes and distorts their utility weights as follows.
Definition 2. The salient thinker’s valuation of good k enhances
the relative utility weight attached to the salient attribute ðkeeping con-
stant the sum of weights attached to quality and priceÞ. Formally,
uSk 5
2
11 d
 qk 2 2d11 d  pk if jðqk; qÞ > jðpk; pÞ
2d
d1 1
 qk 2 2
d1 1
 pk if jðqk; qÞ < jðpk ; pÞ
qk 2 pk if jðqk ; qÞ5 jðpk; pÞ;
8>>><
>>>:
ð5Þ
where d ∈ ð0; 1 decreases in the severity of salient thinking.
If quality is salient, the relative weight of quality increases, 2=ð11 dÞ
> 1, and the relative weight of price decreases, 2d=ð11 dÞ < 1, as com-
pared to the rational consumer’s valuation. In this case, the salient think-
er’s price sensitivity is lower than the rational consumer’s: a riseDp in price
disutility is offset by an increase d  Dp in quality utility, so that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between a quality increase and a price reduction
is d. If instead price is salient, an increase Dp in price is offset by an in-
crease ð1=dÞ  Dp in quality, so that the salient thinker’s marginal rate of
substitution is 1=d. As d→ 1, the salient thinker converges to the rational
thinker. As d→ 0, the salient thinker considers only the most salient at-
tribute and neglects all others. Normalization of the utility weights en-
sures that valuation of the good lies between 2qk and 22pk . In deﬁnition 2,
utility is assumed to be distorted according to the salience ranking of qual-
ity and price. Section II.B discusses the role of this assumption.
To see how the model works, suppose that a consumer is evaluating
two bottles of wine, a high-end wine ðqh; phÞ and a low-end wine ðql ; plÞ,
where qualities and prices are known and satisfy qh > ql and ph > pl . The
reference wine has quality q 5 ðqh 1 qlÞ=2 and price p 5 ðph 1 plÞ=2. Ac-
cording to proposition 1, wine h’s high quality is salient if and only if
qh=ph > q=p, which can be written as
qh
ph
>
q
p
>
ql
pl
: ð6Þ
Thus, qh is salient for wine h when the high-end wine has a higher qual-
ity/price ratio than the low-end wine. Proposition 1 similarly implies that,
when condition ð6Þ holds, the lower quality ql is salient for wine l. In sum,
when the quality/price ratio is higher for the high-quality wine, quality
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is salient for both wines. When the quality/price ratio is higher for the
lower-quality, cheaper wine, price is salient for both wines.
Consider how salience affects choice. When prices are salient, namely,
when qh=ph < ql=pl , expression ð5Þ implies that the low-end wine l is cho-
sen over the high-end wine h provided
d  ðql 2 qhÞ2 ðpl 2 phÞ > 0; ð7Þ
which is easier to satisfy than its rational counterpart, with d5 1. Intui-
tively, when price is salient, the salient thinker undervalues both wines,
but he undervalues the high-end wine more because price is the dimen-
sion along which the high-end wine does worse.
Analogously, when qh=ph > ql=pl , quality is salient and expression ð5Þ
implies that the low-end wine l is chosen over the high-end wine h pro-
vided
ðql 2 qhÞ2 d  ðpl 2 phÞ > 0; ð8Þ
which is harder to satisfy than its rational counterpart, with d5 1. Intui-
tively, when quality is salient, the salient thinker overvalues both wines but
overvalues the high-quality wine more because quality is the dimension
along which the high-end wine does better.
Salience tilts preferences toward the wine offering the highest qual-
ity/price ratio. This is a general property of our model. Suppose that the
salient thinker is choosing between N > 1 goods located along a rational
indifference curve, so that each good k provides the same rational util-
ity. Formally, given the quasi-linear utility in ð1Þ, a rational indifference
curve with utility u is deﬁned as the set of goods k such that qk 2 pk 5 u.
The indifference condition allows us to identify the effect of salience, ab-
stracting from rational utility differences. The N goods display a constant
gradient in quality and price, formally, qk 2 qk0 5 pk 2 pk0 for all k, k 0 5
1; : : : ; N , where p1 <    < pN . In Appendix A we prove the following prop-
osition.
Proposition 2. Let the choice set C lie along a rational indifference
curve, such that ðq; pÞ is not in C. Then the salient thinker chooses the
good with the highest quality/price ratio. Speciﬁcally, he chooses good
k*, where
k* 5 arg max
k51; : : : ; N
qk
pk
;
so that k* 5 1 if q1=p1 > 1, and k* 5 N if q1=p1 < 1. If q1=p1 5 1, then q1=p1
5 qk=pk for all k and the consumer is indifferent between any two goods.
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Proposition 2 captures the basic intuition, long recognized in market-
ing and psychology, that consumers are drawn to goods with a high qual-
ity/price ratio ðor value per dollarÞ.5 It highlights the role of diminishing
sensitivity in the salience mechanism, according to which given price dif-
ferences are less noticeable at higher price levels.
The property that consumers are attracted to goods with high quality/
price ratios extends to more general choice sets, in particular, to the
inclusion in C of the outside option ð0, 0Þ of not buying a good. We have
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let the choice set be C5 fðqk; pkÞgk51; : : : ;N [ fð0; 0Þg,
where goods k 5 1; : : : ;N lie on a rational indifference curve. Suppose
that the cheapest good is preferred to ð0, 0Þ if its price is salient, and the
most expensive good is preferred to ð0, 0Þ if its quality is salient ðformally,
either q1=p1 > 1=d or qN=pN ∈ ðd; 1ÞÞ. Then the following cases obtain:
i. If q1=p1 < 1, the consumer chooses themost expensive good ðqN ; pN Þ,
which has the highest quality/price ratio.
ii. If q1=p1 > 1 and price is salient for all goods, the consumer chooses
the cheapest good ðq1; p1Þ, which has the highest quality/price ra-
tio. If instead quality is salient for intermediate goods k with k ≤
k ≤ k, the consumer chooses the highest-quality good, k, which
still has an above-average quality/price ratio.
Adding the outside option does not change our previous result when
quality is salient, namely, in case i. Matters change slightly in case ii. While
in the absence of the outside option all goods are price salient, adding
ð0, 0Þ reduces the reference quality and price and that may make inter-
mediate goods quality salient. These intermediate goodsmay have a lower
quality/price ratio than the cheapest good ðq1; p1Þ but are nonetheless
preferred to it because they are seen as a good deal relative to the ref-
erence good. Even in this case, however, the chosen good has an above-
average quality/price ratio, consistent with the importance of q=p in
driving the salient thinker’s preferences.
In Appendix B we show how the model works when goods are char-
acterized by several quality dimensions. In this setting, diminishing sen-
sitivity implies that improving one dimension of quality at the expense of
another can increase the salience of the weaker dimension. As a conse-
quence, the consumer tends to be attracted toward goods that have sa-
5 The attraction toward goods with a high quality/price ratio ðor value per dollarÞ has
been explained by assuming that the consumer experiences a distinct “transaction utility”
ðThaler 1999Þ in that he derives direct pleasure frommaking a good deal ð Jahedi 2011Þ. In
our example, the consumer does not derive any special utility from getting a good deal.
Instead, a good deal is attractive because it draws the consumer’s attention to the dimen-
sion in which it does better than its competitor.
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lient strengths and yet are balanced in their quality attributes. An un-
commonly spacious backseat may enhance consumers’ valuation of a car,
but not if this comes at the cost of an extremely small trunk. Producers
often specialize a little, rarely a lot.
B. Discussion
The central idea of our model is that consumers focus on—and thus
overweight—goods’ attributes that stand out in the choice context. This
generalizes to riskless settings the logic of salience, initially developed for
choice under risk. This approach is also consistent with recent results in
neuroeconomics. Hare, Camerer, and Rangel ð2009Þ and Fehr and Ran-
gel ð2011Þ show that subjects evaluate goods by aggregating information
about different attributes, with decision weights modulated by attention.
Our model can be easily applied to standard economic problems by in-
troducing salience-based valuation into a “rational” economic model. Do-
ing so requires two key inputs describing the economic problem: ðiÞ the
choice set and ðiiÞ the attributes of each good that carry utility. We then
add ingredients speciﬁc to the salience model, namely, ðiiiÞ the reference
good, ðivÞ a salience function, and ðvÞ a speciﬁcation of salience weight-
ing of attributes. We now discuss these ingredients in turn.
Rational models typically specify the product attributes in the utility
function, as well as the choice set faced by the consumer. To apply the
salience distortions of deﬁnition 2 in our model, the utility function also
needs to be separable.6 The most straightforward applications of our
model feature only two attributes, quality and price, with utility linear
in price.7 When direct measurement of quality is unavailable, in our ap-
proach—as in rationalmodels—a good’s quality can be obtained as a latent
variable that may depend on the measurable characteristics of the good.
6 We make three remarks on assuming the separable utility function ð1Þ. First, adopting
an additive representation of preferences allows us to apply the formalism we developed in
Bordalo et al. ð2012Þ. Appendix B extends the model to arbitrary weights on quality and
price. We have not included the consumer’s income w in the numeraire good, from which
the consumer obtains utility w 2 pk, because w is not an attribute of the good, so its val-
uation is not distorted by salience. Second, given separability of the utility function, it is
natural to assume linearity in the observed price ðmeasured in dollarsÞ since in most con-
sumer choice settings income effects are not too large. Third, the analysis could be ex-
tended to the case of a gain-loss utility, namely, when consumers evaluate the utility of a
good’s quality and price relative to a reference level.
7 If, however, ﬁrms advertise or specialize along speciﬁc dimensions of quality or price, it
may be useful to deﬁne salience directly on these dimensions, along the lines of the model
of App. B. For instance, models of shrouded attributes ðGabaix and Laibson 2006Þ assume
that consumers neglect certain price or quality components. Chetty, Looney, andKroft ð2009Þ
suggest that consumers may not take into account some price dimensions of a purchase such
as taxes. In a multiattribute model, the logic of salience may help to explain which prices or
quality components endogenously become shrouded ðe.g., why consumers neglect them and
why ﬁrms choose not to compete on themÞ.
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We restrict the admissible salience functions by assuming homogeneity
of degree zero, which implies that salience is invariant to scalar trans-
formations of attributes. Under this assumption, we can elicit utility of
quality directly within our model from willingness-to-pay experiments;
see Section V. While we do not claim that this assumption is universally
applicable, it is supported by an emerging paradigm in psychology stress-
ing that people possess an innate “core number system” that compares
magnitudes in terms of ratios.8 Homogeneity of degree zero is also for-
mally convenient as it ensures that the salience ranking is invariant un-
der linear transformations of the units ðdollarsÞ in which the attributes
are measured. Thus, even though we deﬁned salience to be a property
of dollar attributes, under assumption 1, it can be deﬁned over utils pro-
vided that the latter are a scalar transformation of dollars.9
We assume that salience weighting is determined by salience ranking,
with the magnitude of the salience distortion characterized by the param-
eter d. Together with homogeneity of degree zero, this assumption makes
our model signiﬁcantly more tractable and applicable since the effects
of salience are characterized in terms of rankings of quality/price ratios.
Psychologically, rank-based discounting captures the idea that valuation
can be drastically affected by introducing small differences in an attri-
bute such as price ðTverksy 1972; Kim, Novemsky, and Dhar 2012Þ. One
feature of rank-based discounting is that valuation can be nonmonotonic,
which may be undesirable in some applications. In online Appendix C,
we show that with a continuous salience weighting, nonmonotonicities
disappear under general conditions and all our results qualitatively carry
through.
Finally, an important step in applying our model is to appropriately
specify the choice context, or the reference good, with respect to which
salience is deﬁned. In deterministic settings, the choice context can be
assumed to coincide with the choice set, in line with our formal analysis
so far. This is also the case in lab experiments in which subjects are in-
duced to think only about the choice set.10
8 According to Feigenson,Dehaene, and Spelke ð2004Þ, “To sumup, theﬁndings indicate
that infants, children and adults share a common system for quantiﬁcation.” This system
exhibits a logarithmic ði.e., ratio-basedÞ representation of numerical magnitude: “numeri-
cal representations therefore show two hallmarks: they are ratio-dependent and are robust
across multiple modalities of input.” Interestingly, the “system becomes integrated with the
symbolic number system used by children and adults for enumeration and computation”
(309).
9 Speciﬁcally, the ordering and diminishing properties of deﬁnition 1 would carry through
fromdollars to utils, even if utils were an afﬁne transformation of dollars. This is no longer the
case if utils are a nonlinear transformation of dollars.
10 In this paper, we take the choice set as given, but evidence suggests that consumers
typically consider only a subset of the options available in the market. The typical number
of options in such consideration sets ðor evoked setsÞ ranges from two to ﬁve goods ðsee
Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990Þ. This observation justiﬁes our occasional focus on small
choice sets. Endogenizing the consideration or evoked set is an important direction of fu-
ture work; see Hauser and Wernerfelt ð1990Þ and Eliaz and Spiegler ð2011Þ.
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In stochastic settings, a broader notion of context is needed. In those
cases, an attribute’s salience also depends on how much this particular
realization differs from prior expectations. In Section IV, we extend the
model to settings that depend on subjects’ expectations ðincluding Tha-
ler’s beer exampleÞ by assuming that the choice context also includes the
agents’ rational price expectations. This extension captures the idea that
the choice situation brings to the consumer’smind “normal” prices, which
then shape the consumer’s reference price ðKahneman and Miller 1986Þ.
Several models of consumer choice seek to rationalize context effects
by incorporating loss aversion relative to a reference good ðsee Tversky
and Kahneman 1991; Tversky and Simonson 1993; Bodner and Prelec
1994Þ. An implication of these models is a bias toward middle-of-the-road
options, which avoid large perceived losses in every attribute. This pre-
diction is hard to reconcile with evidence that in many situations consum-
ers do choose extreme options. Moreover, these models do not speak to
the other puzzles reviewed in the introduction, such as the Savage car
radio problem, context-dependent willingness to pay, or theHastings and
Shapiro data.11
Gabaix ð2012Þ develops a model of rational inattention in which at-
tention to different product attributes is efﬁciently allocated ex ante,
leading the consumer to neglect some of the attributes. In our model,
consumer attention to different product attributes is drawn ex post, de-
pending on which attribute stands out.
Models of relative thinking assume that valuation of a good depends
on the “referent” levels of its characteristics ðAzar 2007; Cunningham
2011Þ. The fundamental assumption is that the marginal utility of a char-
acteristic decreases with the level of its referent, which is reminiscent of
the diminishing sensitivity property of salience. Cunningham reproduces
some related patterns of choice, such as the Savage car radio puzzle. This
approach, however, does not account for patterns of choice in which or-
dering plays a role, such as theHastings and Shapiro evidence on gasoline
ðSec. IV.AÞ.
Koszegi and Szeidl ð2013Þ build a model that centrally features the
idea of ordering: their consumers are essentially salient thinkers who fo-
cus on and overweigh those attributes in which options differ the most
in terms of utility. Koszegi and Szeidl use their model to shed light on
biases in intertemporal choice. By neglecting diminishing sensitivity, their
model predicts a strong bias toward concentration; namely, consumers
tend to overvalue options whose advantages are concentrated in a single
dimension. This bias seems difﬁcult to reconcile with the evidence on
11 In our model, diminishing sensitivity implies a “loss aversion” type of effect: deviations
occurring below the reference attribute level are more salient than those occurring above it.
For attributes yielding positive utility, this is reminiscent of the idea that “losses loom larger
than gains.” The implications for valuation, however, are very different from loss aversion.
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diminishing sensitivity ðsuch as the Savage car radio puzzleÞ and also with
the evident desire of high-quality manufacturers to avoid shortcomings
in any aspect of their merchandise.
By combining diminishing sensitivity with ordering within a choice
context, our model generates the central prediction linking price sensi-
tivity to context: consumers are relatively insensitive to price differences
among goods of different qualities at expected high price levels, while
they are price sensitive when faced with unexpected parallel price in-
creases. This mechanism both provides a uniﬁed account of several well-
known choice patterns and puzzles and generates new implications.
III. Salience and Demand for Quality
We now examine the implications of our model for the reaction of con-
sumers to two distinct manipulations of the choice set. We ﬁrst explore
diminishing sensitivity by considering uniform price shifts of all the
goods in the choice set.We then explore ordering by considering changes
in the reference good due to the addition of an irrelevant alternative.
A. Price Differences across Contexts and Diminishing Sensitivity
The wine example from the introduction suggests that a consumer’s
price sensitivity depends on the price level, namely, that the consumer is
more price sensitive when choosing among cheaper goods. This idea is
a direct implication of proposition 2.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the choice set C lies on a rational in-
difference curve and that prices are given by pk 1 D for some constant
D ≥ 0. If for D5 0 the salient thinker chooses the lowest-quality good
k 5 1, then there exists a threshold D* > 0 such that for D < D* he
chooses k 5 1 while for D > D* he chooses the highest-quality good
k 5 N .
The corollary establishes a sense in which the demand for quality is
increasing in the level of prices.12 In the wine example from the intro-
duction, the consumer chooses between two wines of qualities qh 5 30
and ql 5 20. At the store, prices are ph 5 20 and pl 5 10. At the restau-
rant, prices are uniformly increased by Dp 5 40. Though the quality
gradient qh 2 ql and the price gradient ph 2 pl are the same in the two
situations, the consumer chooses the cheap wine at the store and the ex-
pensive wine at the restaurant. Owing to diminishing sensitivity of the
salience function, the price difference of 10 between the wines is more
noticeable to the consumer at the low price level of the store than at the
12 For a rational thinker with d51, demand is independent of the price shift D.
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high price level of the restaurant. To see how this example illustrates the
logic of corollary 1, note that at the store, the cheaper wine has a higher
quality/price ratio ð20=10 > 30=20Þ, while at the restaurant the ranking
is reversed ð20=50 < 30=60Þ. Price is salient at the store; quality is salient
at the restaurant.
Diminishing sensitivity can lead to several of the preference reversals
discussed in the introduction, such as Savage’s ð1954Þ car radio problem
or Kahneman and Tversky’s ð1984Þ jacket-calculator problem, formal-
izing Thaler’s ð1980Þ intuitive argument based on Weber’s law.13 Owing
to diminishing sensitivity, the salience mechanism induces consumers to
display higher price sensitivity for choice among cheaper goods.14 As we
show in Section IV, in nondeterministic settings the strength of this ef-
fect depends on price expectations.
B. Decoy and Compromise Effects
A well-documented anomaly in both marketing and psychology is the so-
called decoy effect ðHuber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Tversky and Simonson
1993Þ: adding to a pairwise choice an option dominated by one of the
goods boosts the demand for the dominating good. Another well-known
anomaly is the compromise effect ðSimonson 1989Þ: adding an extreme
option to a pairwise choice induces subjects to change their preferences
toward the middle-of-the-road, or compromise, option. Assuming, along
the lines of Section II, that the consumer is perfectly informed about the
available goods, both anomalies constitute violations of the IIA.15
Our model can provide an intuitive account for these phenomena as a
consequence of the impact of the added option on salience. The prop-
osition below describes conditions under which such preference rever-
sals arise, providing a novel and testable prediction of our model.
13 A salient thinker is more likely to buy a car radio when the price of the radio is added
to the price of the car than when the radio is sold in isolation, separately from the car
purchase. To see how this works, note that diminishing sensitivity implies that the salience
of the price pr of the radio is higher when evaluated in isolation, jðpr ; pr=2Þ, than against
the backdrop of the much higher price p of the car, jðp 1 pr ; p 1 pr=2Þ. Intuitively, the cost
of the add-on is less salient when it is “hidden” behind the high price of the core good.
14 This mechanism differs from models based on loss aversion. In Bodner and Prelec’s
ð1994Þ model, consumers evaluate each good’s gains and losses relative to the same refer-
ence good, namely, the “centroid” ðor averageÞ good in the choice set. As prices increase
uniformly, the gains/losses relative to the reference price stay constant, leaving choice un-
changed. In our model, in contrast, as prices increase, a given price difference becomes less
salient because salience is evaluated relative to not experiencing an attribute and not with
respect to experiencing its reference level. Price levels can also affect the rational consum-
er’s choice through income effects, but in the opposite direction of our prediction: under
concave utility, consumers are more price sensitive at higher price levels.
15 Wernerfelt ð1995Þ and Kamenica ð2008Þ explain the decoy effects by suggesting that
decoys indirectly provide consumers with information about the quality of the products.
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Proposition 4. Let C5 fðql ; plÞ; ðqh; phÞg and assume that ðqh; phÞ is
preferred to ðql ; plÞ if and only if its higher quality is salient; formally,
2ð12 dÞðph 2 plÞ ≤ Du ≤ ð12 dÞðqh 2 qlÞ;
where Du 5 ðqh 2 qlÞ2 ðph 2 plÞ is the rational utility difference between
the goods. Let ðqd ; pdÞ be a decoy good such that ðqh; phÞ retains above-
average quality and price in the enlarged choice set Cd 5 C [ fðqd ; pdÞg
ði.e., qh > q and ph > pÞ. Then the following cases obtain:
i. If ql=pl > qh=ph, so that price is salient and ðql ; plÞ is chosen from C,
then for any ðqd ; pdÞ satisfying
qd
pd
<
qh
ph
1
pl
pd

qh
ph
2
ql
pl

;
good ðqh; phÞ is quality salient inCd . Moreover, there exist decoys sat-
isfying the previous condition and qd > qh, pd > ph such that ðqh; phÞ
is chosen from Cd .
ii. If ql=pl < qh=ph, so that quality is salient and ðqh; phÞ is chosen from
C, then there exists no decoy such that qd=pd ≤ ql=pl and ðqh; phÞ
is price salient in Cd . In particular, for no decoy satisfying qd=pd
≤ ql=pl is ðql ; plÞ chosen from Cd .
Result i says that the decoy must be a bad deal, namely, a good with a
signiﬁcantly lower quality/price ratio than other available goods. When
qd=pd is low, it lowers the quality/price ratio of the reference good to the
point that qh=ph > q=p. As a consequence, the quality of ðqh; phÞ becomes
salient, so this good is now overvalued and is chosen in the enlarged
choice set ðprovided that the decoy is not so good that the consumer pre-
fers it to ðqh; phÞÞ.
To illustrate this mechanism, consider again the wine example from
the introduction, with a variation in which a third, more expensive and
high-quality wine ðqd 5 30; pd 5 30Þ is added to the wine selection at the
store:
Cstore 5 fð30; 20Þ; ð20; 10Þg;
CstoreðdÞ 5 fð30; 20Þ; ð20; 10Þ; ð30; 30Þg: ð9Þ
The decoy wine ð30, 30Þ yields lower utility than the original options, as
uð30; 30Þ5 0 < uð30; 20Þ5 uð20; 10Þ5 10:
818 journal of political economy
For a rational decision maker, the inclusion of the decoy in the choice
set is irrelevant.
Consider the choice of a salient thinker. As shown in Section III.A, in
Cstore the salient thinker picks the low-end wine ðql ; plÞ because ðqh; phÞ
has a below-average quality/price ratio, so that its high price is salient.
When the decoy is added, however, things change. In fact, the quality/
price ratio of the decoy wine, 30=30, is lower than the quality/price ratio
of the high-end wine, 30=20. Thus, by comparison with ðqd ; pdÞ, the high-
end wine ðqh; phÞ seems a better deal than in the original choice set!
Formally, in CstoreðdÞ, the reference wine is ð26.7, 20Þ. The high-end wine
delivers above reference quality 30 > 26:7 at the reference price 20. As
a consequence, the quality of ðqh; phÞ becomes salient, which implies that
ðqh; phÞ is now preferred to ðql ; plÞ, yielding the decoy effect.
In this example, the decoy is dominated by ðqh; phÞ. Critically, however,
case i above shows that this violation of IIA can also arise when qd > qh
and pd > ph so that, in the augmented choice set, the high-end wine pro-
vides intermediate levels of quality and price but offers a good quality/
price ratio when compared to the decoy. This creates a compromise ef-
fect in our model, with the same logic as the decoy effect.
Consider next result ii of proposition 4. It says that the decoy effect is
asymmetric in the sense that it does not reverse an initial preference for
high-quality goods. When quality is salient in pairwise choice ðnamely,
qh=ph > ql=plÞ, adding a decoy to the lower-quality good ðql ; plÞ may cause
its low price to become salient. However, since the decoy reduces the qual-
ity/price ratio of the reference good, it cannot at the same timemake the
high price of ðqh; phÞ salient. Since this high-end good remains quality
salient, it is still chosen in the enlarged choice set. There are instances,
not contemplated in proposition 4, in which a decoy may increase the
relative valuation of a lower-quality good.16 However, proposition 4 cap-
tures an important asymmetry generated by our model whereby goods
with high quality and high price are more likely to beneﬁt from decoys
than their low-quality, low-price competitors.
The asymmetry of decoy effects is consistent with Heath and Chatter-
jee’s ð1995Þ survey of experimental and ﬁeld results on decoys. In agree-
ment with our predictions, the authors document a robust asymmetry
in the workings of the decoy effect: adding appropriate decoys typically
boosts experimental subjects’ demand for high-quality goods at the ex-
pense of demand for low-quality goods. In contrast, adding decoys for
low-quality goods does not boost the demand for these goods. In this
respect, our model differs substantially from formalizations of context
16 These include decoys with extremely high quality/price ratios but very low levels of
quality.
salience and consumer choice 819
dependence based on loss aversion ðTversky and Simonson 1993; Bodner
and Prelec 1994Þ, where consumers minimize losses across all attributes
and mechanically prefer middle-of-the-road options, so that asymmetries
do not arise.
IV. Salience and Expectations
So far we took a narrow view of the choice context by identifying it with
the choice set C. A long tradition in psychology, however, stresses that
the choice context is not limited to the choice set but includes also the
alternatives that the decision maker expects to ﬁnd in the current choice
setting ðKahneman and Miller 1986Þ. As we stressed previously, this as-
pect seems relevant to understanding several phenomena. For example,
in the Thaler beer example, framing subjects with a speciﬁc context ðre-
sort or storeÞ makes them think about the price they could expect in that
context. In the Hastings and Shapiro example, the consumer approaches
the gas station having in mind a price expectation for gas. The logic of
our model implies that, once evoked, expected prices shape choice by af-
fecting the salience ranking of different product attributes.
To see how these effects may work, we incorporate expectations in our
deﬁnition of context. In a straightforward way, we assume that the choice
context consists of the goods in the choice set together with those same
goods at their rationally expected prices.
Definition 3. The choice context is the set Ccont 5 C [ Ce , where C
is the externally given choice set and Ce 5 fðqek ; pekÞgk51; : : : ;N is the set of
goods the consumer expects to ﬁnd in the choice setting. We make the
following assumptions:
i. For each ðqk; pkÞ ∈ C, there is a ðqek ; pekÞ whose expected quality sat-
isﬁes qek 5 qk and whose expected price p
e
k is the rational expecta-
tion of pk , namely, pek ; E½pk.
ii. The choice context is summarized by a reference good ðq; pÞ,
where the reference ðor normalÞ levels of quality and price are
their average values in Ccont, namely, q 5 ð1=N Þokqk and p 5
ð1=2N Þokðpk 1 pekÞ.
This deﬁnition captures the idea that the choice situation brings to
the consumer’s mind “normal” prices, which then shape the consumer’s
reference price ðKahneman and Miller 1986Þ. Assuming rational expec-
tations is an intuitive and model-consistent way to capture normal prices,
although it is not universally applicable.17
17 In some settings, the prices rationally expected in a speciﬁc situation might be per-
ceived as being far from normal, for instance, the price of a tuna sandwich at an airport or
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Deﬁnition 3 has two important implications. First, when actual prices
coincide with price expectations ði.e., when pk 5 E½pk for all kÞ, the ref-
erence good in the choice context coincides with the average good in
the choice set. As a result, the consumer behaves as if the choice context
and the choice set coincide,Ccont 5 C. In this sense, our previous analysis
is directly applicable to deterministic settings or to lab experiments in
which, unless explicitly primed, consumers have no experience to base
their forecasts on.
Second, when expected and actual prices differ, the model uncovers
an important new effect: the salience of price is determined not only by
comparing prices across goods but also by comparing actual prices with
expected prices. Even if the price of a good is similar to that of other
goods, it may be salient if it is unexpectedly high. The salient thinker’s
attention is drawn not just to differences between available options but
also to the surprising features of the environment.18
A. Price Shifts: Diminishing Sensitivity versus Ordering
We now provide a general characterization of the effects of price changes
in our model. We show how the model generates two seemingly contra-
dictory implications: lower price sensitivity at higher price levels but higher
price sensitivity after unexpected price hikes. These results are due to the
tension between the basic forces of diminishing sensitivity and ordering.
Take the choice context Ccont as given and consider the effect on sa-
lience of a marginal price increase in a proper subset of Ccont. Here Ccont
includes both available goods and the same goods at expected prices.
Let us partition Ccont into two subsets, CF and CC, such that CF is the set
of goods for which price is held ﬁxed and CC is the set of goods whose
prices uniformly increase. Formally, suppose that the prices for goods
k in CC are increased from pk to pk 1 D, where D is a marginal uniform
price increase for all goods in CC. Depending on the “experiment,” CC
can include actual prices, expected prices, or both. The following cases
are of particular interest:
18 Our use of rational expectations is reminiscent of Koszegi and Rabin’s ð2006Þ model,
in which reference points coincide with expectations, but has two important differences.
First, in our model, expectations are fully exogenous in that they are determined by the
entire choice context, and not by what is actually chosen. This simpliﬁes the model and
facilitates its application because it requires the modeler to know only the exogenous em-
pirical distribution of prices. Second, our mechanism relies on salience relative to the ref-
erence good, and not on loss aversion. These two forces often act in directly opposite di-
rections, for instance, when a good’s quality is salient.
of a hotdog at a baseball game. Assuming rational expectations strikes a balance between
psychological precision and testability of the model.
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a. Expected price hikes, as in the store versus restaurant example: In
this case, both actual and expected prices change, so that CC 5 C
and CF 5 ∅.
b. Unexpected price hikes: Here only actual prices change while ex-
pected prices stay constant in the choice context, so thatCC 5 Cchoice
and CF 5 Ce .
c. Relative price changes: Only a subset of actual ðand perhaps ex-
pectedÞ prices changes. Here CC is the subset of actual ðand ex-
pectedÞ goods whose relative price changes, while CF contains all
remaining ðactual and expectedÞ goods.
Denote by h the fraction of goods in the choice context that belong to
CC. Denote by p F the average price in subsetCF, by pC the average price in
CC, and by p the reference ðaverageÞ price in Ccont, where all prices are
computed with D5 0. In example a, h5 1 and pC 5 p. In example b, h
5 1=2 and p F 5 pC 5 p. In example c, average prices depend on the spe-
ciﬁc goods considered and h may be small, close to zero. We then show
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that pC ≥ p. Then a uniform marginal in-
crease D in the prices of goods in CC boosts the salience of price for the
most expensive good in CC only if
pmaxC 2 pC
pF
<
12 h
h
; ð10Þ
where pmaxC is the highest price in CC. If h5 1, price salience falls for all
goods in CC.
Take a category of goods that are originally at least as expensive as
average ði.e., pC ≥ pÞ. A uniform marginal increase in the prices in this
category boosts the salience of price for its most expensive members—
and thus increases the consumer’s price sensitivity for these goods—
provided that the category affected by the price hike is sufﬁciently small,
namely, h is small.
The size h of the category affected by the price hike modulates the
strength of ordering versus diminishing sensitivity. When the category is
large, the price hike induces a commensurate increase in the reference
price p. As a consequence, the price differential between category prices
and the reference price does not grow signiﬁcantly. Diminishing sensi-
tivity dominates, equation ð10Þ does not hold, and a price increase re-
duces the salience of price. This is what happens in the case of fully ex-
pected price hikes, such as in setting a above: actual and expected prices
uniformly increase ðh5 1Þ and price salience falls for all goods, includ-
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ing the very expensive ones. The consumer’s price sensitivity is reduced
for all goods.
Suppose, in contrast, that the category affected by the price hikes is
small ðin the limit, h ≈ 0Þ. Now the reference price p is only modestly
affected by the price hike. As a consequence, the price differential be-
tween category prices and p grows disproportionately. In this case, or-
dering dominates, equation ð10Þ holds, and a price increase boosts the
salience of price. The surprising price hike of setting b above falls into
this case: only actual prices increase while expected prices stay constant
ðso h5 1=2Þ. Because the prices of the available goods are very high rel-
ative to the reference price, the most expensive goods become price sa-
lient. This increases the consumer’s price sensitivity to these goods.
As illustrated in setting c, this phenomenon describes consumers’ re-
action not only to surprises in overall price levels but also to relative price
changes. Imagine, for instance, a consumer choosing among different
qualities of Bordeaux wines. Equation ð10Þ says that as the price of Bor-
deaux wines uniformly increases, the consumer is more likely to substi-
tute toward cheaper Bordeaux ðor potentially to leave the category alto-
getherÞ if Bordeaux wines are, on average, expensive and display relatively
low price dispersion.
In sum, proposition 5 provides the central comparative statics on how
price sensitivity depends on context: consumers are relatively insensitive
to price differences among goods at expected high prices, while they are
very price sensitive when faced with unexpected price increases. Fur-
thermore, our model yields testable predictions on whether price hikes
boost or dampen the demand for quality, depending on the magnitude
of the price hike and on the market structure ðmeasured by h and price
dispersion pmaxC 2 pC in eq. ½10Þ.
To illustrate the workings of proposition 5, consider again the wine
example from the introduction. As the salient thinker opens the wine
list at his favorite restaurant, he forms rational expectations of the prices
he may ﬁnd. Suppose that these expectations are given by peh ; E½phjrest
5 60 and pel ; E½pl jrest5 50. To account for the possibility that actual
prices are higher than expected, write actual prices as presth 5 601 s and
prestl 5 501 s, where s ≥ 0 is the price surprise. If s 5 0, we are in case a,
where h5 1 and price expectations coincide with actual prices. If instead
s > 0, we are in case b, where h5 1=2 and the consumer faces an unex-
pected price increase. The consumer’s choice context depends on the
price shock s:
Crest 5
hrest 5 ð30; 601 sÞ
l rest 5 ð20; 501 sÞ
he ;rest 5 ð30; 60Þ
l e ;rest 5 ð20; 50Þ:
8><
>:
ð11Þ
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The reference wine is ðq; pÞ5 ð25; 551 ðs=2ÞÞ. The high-end wine hrest
still yields above-average quality, but it may now exhibit a lower than av-
erage quality/price ratio. This is indeed the case provided that
30
601 s
<
25
551 ðs=2Þ ⇔ s > 15: ð12Þ
As implied by proposition 5, if the price surprise is sufﬁciently large, the
high-end wine becomes price salient. This greatly reduces the value of hrest
as perceived by the salient thinker. This price surprise might also render
the low-end wine price salient, but it unambiguously reduces the relative
valuation of the high-end wine, inducing the consumer to choose the low-
end wine. When the consumer ﬁnds wines at the restaurant to be unex-
pectedly pricey, he switches to lower-quality wine, excessively reducing his
demand for quality relative to the rational case.
Compare this result with the case in which restaurant prices are high
but fully expected, namely, s 5 0. In that case, the consumer is adapted
to higher wine prices, and by diminishing sensitivity, he focuses on qual-
ity and chooses the high-quality wine. The key difference with the pre-
vious case is that now high restaurant prices are fully expected and so do
not draw the consumer’s attention.
To conclude the analysis, consider what happenswhen restaurant prices
are surprisingly low, namely, s < 0. In this case, equation ð12Þ is harder to
satisfy. Relative to historical prices, the high-end wine now has a high qual-
ity/price ratio. Thus, unexpectedly low prices tend to draw the consumer’s
attention to quality, reducing his price sensitivity. The high-quality wine is
now chosen over its low-quality competitor. Interestingly, this effect holds
only for moderate price drops. If the price drop is sufﬁciently drastic, the
consumer’s attention is necessarily drawn to prices, which again favors the
low-quality wine. Our model thus exhibits an asymmetry whereby unex-
pected price hikes always induce consumers to substitute toward cheaper
goods while unexpected price declines tend to, but do not always, induce
consumers to substitute toward more expensive goods.
This intuition helps account for the evidence in Hastings and Shapiro
ð2013Þ. They show that consumers react to parallel increases in gas prices
by switching to cheaper ðand lower-qualityÞ gasoline. In online Appen-
dix D, we show how the broad patterns in the demand for gasoline doc-
umented by Hastings and Shapiro emerge from our model, namely, that
the share of regular gasoline rises with gas prices, as consumers’ price sen-
sitivity is asymmetrically boosted by price hikes. The intuition follows
from proposition 5: assuming that gas prices follow a random walk, the
rationally expected prices coincide with the last observed prices. If the
consumer observes surprisingly high prices for all gas grades, the price of
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the high-quality grade becomes even more salient, making the consumer
relatively more sensitive to price differences and more likely to switch to
lower-octane, cheaper gas. If instead the consumer observes surprisingly
low prices for all gas grades, then, as long as the price drop is not too
steep, the price of the high-quality grade approaches the reference price
and is therefore less likely to be salient, making the consumer less sensi-
tive to price differences and more likely to switch to higher-octane, more
expensive gas.19
B. Manipulation of Expectations
The willingness to pay ðWTPÞ for quality q is deﬁned as the maximum
price at which the consumer is willing to buy q instead of sticking to the
outside option of no consumption ðq0; p0Þ. Typically q0 5 p0 5 0. In stan-
dard theory, knowledge of q and of q0 and p0 are sufﬁcient to determine
WTP for q ðassuming quasi-linear utility, as we do hereÞ. In contrast to this
prediction, evidence suggests that the WTP for a good can be inﬂuenced
by contextual factors ðThaler 1985Þ. Our model indicates that WTP may
vary across contexts that differ in price expectations.
Formally, suppose that the consumer must state his WTP for quality q
while expecting a good ðq; peÞ, where pe is the expected price at which
quality q is sold. The consumer evaluates the good ðq, pÞ at a price p, so
his choice context is Ccont ; fð0; 0Þ; ðq; peÞ; ðq; pÞg, where ð0, 0Þ is the out-
side option of not consuming q. We deﬁne the consumer’s WTP for q in
this context as
WTPðqjðq; peÞÞ5 sup p
subject to uSððq; pÞjCcontÞ ≥ uSðð0; 0ÞjCcontÞ:
ð13Þ
WTP is still deﬁned as the maximum price p that the consumer is will-
ing to pay for q as opposed to getting the outside option ð0, 0Þ, but the
superscript S indicates that the consumer’s preferences are distorted by
salience. Crucially, different values of the good’s price p can alter the sa-
lience of its attributes, changing the consumer’s valuation. Thus, maxi-
19 Hastings and Shapiro calibrate a salience model and evaluate its predictions. An im-
portant aspect of the calibration is the measurement of quality, which shapes the salience
of quality to the consumer, affecting his reaction to given price changes. This particular set-
ting suggests two measures of quality, one numerical ð87 vs. 91 octane ratingÞ and one de-
scriptive ðregular vs. premium gasolineÞ. The descriptive measure likely conveys a more sa-
lient quality difference than a 4 percent difference in octane rating. Lacking guidance on
whichmeasure to use, inmany applications itmay be useful to treat quality as a latent variable
ðeven when certain objective proxies for quality are availableÞ to be estimated with the re-
maining parameters of the model.
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mization in ð13Þ tends to select a price p such that good ðq, pÞ’s quality is
salient.
In the choice contextCcont, the reference good has quality q 5 q  ð2=3Þ
and price p 5 ðp 1 peÞ=3. We can then show the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The consumer’s WTP for q depends on the expected
price pe as follows:
WTPðqjðq; peÞÞ5
dq if pe ≤ dq
pe if dq < pe ≤
1
d
 q
q
d
if
1
d
 q < pe ≤ 7
2d
 q
dq if pe >
7
2d
 q:
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð14Þ
As d→ 1, the WTP tends to q and becomes independent of context pe .
The price expectation pe affects WTP only if the consumer is a salient
thinker, that is, if d < 1. Importantly, for pe ≤ ð7=2dÞq, the consumer’s
WTP weakly increases in the expected price pe . In contexts in which
quality is more expensive, the consumer is willing to pay a higher price p
and still view quality as salient.20 Through salience, a higher price pe acts
like an anchor, increasing WTP. This mechanism can explain Thaler’s
beer experiment, in which subjects stated a higher WTP when the place
from which a beer is bought was speciﬁed to be a nearby resort hotel
than when it was a nearby grocery store. This follows from proposition 6
because the expected price at the resort is higher than that in the store
ði.e., peresort > pestoreÞ. Intuitively, when thinking of the high expected price
at the resort, the salient thinker is willing to pay a high price for the beer
and still perceive quality as salient. When thinking of the low expected
price at the store, however, the salient thinker is not willing to pay a high
price for the beer because such a high price would be salient at the store.
Interestingly, proposition 6 suggests that when the reference price is
extremely high, this effect vanishes. In this respect our model yields a dif-
ferent prediction than the one based on transaction utility. If the expected
price is too high, formally if pe ≫ q=d, price becomes salient and the con-
sumer’s WTP drops. Intuitively, if the consumer expects beer at resorts
to be outrageously expensive, then he focuses on the high prices at the
resort, which causes his valuation for beer to drop in this context. As a
result, the consumer refuses to buy a beer even if the price is close to his
20 Put differently, as pe increases, the consumer perceives ðq, pÞ as a good deal even at
higher prices p.
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true valuation. In fact, this causes the consumer’s WTP to drop below his
true valuation. The WTP in ð14Þ is graphically represented in ﬁgure 1.
V. Falsiﬁable Predictions of the Model
In the previous sections we characterized the predictions of the model
that hold when the choice context C [ Ce is known. In realistic settings,
though, only some features of the choice context ðe.g., the prices of
goods in the choice setÞ are readily available to an observer. Other inputs
to the model such as the precise quality levels or the expected prices are
difﬁcult to observe. We now highlight some falsiﬁable predictions of our
model when the researcher does not have direct knowledge of quality lev-
els and/or expected prices. We study predictions that hold under any sa-
lience function satisfying assumption 1 and consider two scenarios:
1. The choice context coincides with the choice set. Quality rankings
are observed but quality levels are not.
2. The choice context includes expected prices. Quality rankings are
observed but neither quality levels nor expected prices are ob-
served.
FIG. 1.—Willingness to pay for q as a function of expected price pe
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Scenario 1 holds in lab experiments, in which subjects do not have
strong preexisting expectations about prices ðunless these are induced
by the experimenterÞ, but it also holds in the ﬁeld when consumers are
familiar with the available goods and prices can ðroughlyÞ be assumed to
be stable. One interesting property of this scenario is that even if the
quality q of a good is not directly observable, it can be recovered by the
researcher by running a pricing experiment eliciting a subject’s WTP. In
such an experiment, the choice set is given by C; fðq; pÞ; ð0; 0Þg, where
p is the asking price. Because the choice set coincides with the choice
context, the reference good is ðq; pÞ; ðq=2; p=2Þ. Under a homogeneous
of degree zero salience function, we have that
jðq; q=2Þ5 jðp; p=2Þ5 jð1; 1=2Þ:
That is, quality and price are equally salient for any asking price p. We now
make the following remark.
Remark 1. In the choice context C; fðq; pÞ; ð0; 0Þg, valuation is not
distorted by salience and the salient thinker’s willingness to pay for q is
WTP 5 q.
When a good is evaluated in isolation and without price expectations,
the WTP for it equals its quality level, just as in the rational model. The
absence of salience distortions is ensured by the assumption that the out-
side option is given by ð0, 0Þ ðtogether with homogeneity of the salience
functionÞ. This assumption is realistic in the sense that salience is deﬁned
over product attributes, and the option of not buying the good is natu-
rally framed as zero price and quality. WTP is best elicited in a controlled
laboratory setting, where this framing can be made explicit.
The ability to recover quality through WTP is important because it can
in principle allow researchers to directly test the predictions of themodel,
such as those highlighted in proposition 4, in deterministic or lab settings
in which price expectations do not play a role.
But even if WTP cannot be readily elicited through price experiments
ðe.g., in certain ﬁeld applicationsÞ, information on quality ordering still
yields falsiﬁable predictions based on price changes ðwhich are observ-
ableÞ in situations in which the choice context coincides with the choice
set. In particular, consider scenario 1, in which the choice context coin-
cides with the choice set and the researcher observes only prices and the
ranking of qualities. The simplest setting consists of a binary choice be-
tween a high-quality and a low-quality good. In this case, one can directly
test the prediction of corollary 1, whereby the demand for the high-quality
good should ðweaklyÞ rise after an expected uniform price increase. In
fact, this prediction depends only on knowledge of ðiÞ prices and ðiiÞ the
quality ranking of the two goods.
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With more than two goods the analysis is more complicated, but our
model still yields testable predictions. Suppose that the choice set has
N > 2 goods and that the researcher observes quality rankings q1 < q2
<    < qN and prices p1 1 D < p2 1 D <    < pN 1 D, whereD ≥ 0. Because
we are in scenario 1, the researcher observes the reference price p 5
ð1=N Þokpk 1 D and can manipulate all prices that determine p. We can
then prove the following prediction.
Prediction 1. Let pj > ð1=N Þokpk > pi , and suppose that a consumer
chooses good i when D5 0 and good j > i when D5 D* > 0. Then, keep-
ing D5 0, if the prices of all goods k  i, j experience a uniform increase
so that the new average price is equal to pj , then good j is preferred to
good i, so the latter cannot be chosen.
This result highlights the mechanics underlying violations of the IIA
in our model. It exploits the fact that the consumers’ price sensitivity
toward the high-quality good j is reduced under two distinct patterns of
price increases: if a uniform price hike reduces the consumer’s price
sensitivity and induces him to switch to higher quality qj > qi, then the
consumer must choose qj as its price becomes less salient. As a result, IIA
can be violated by changing the prices of “irrelevant” goods k  i, j so as
to render the quality qj salient. The best way to implement this proce-
dure experimentally is to rely on between-subject tests in order to avoid a
situation in which price manipulations inﬂuence the formation of price
expectations in the lab. The prediction can also be tested in a within-
subject paradigm, but only when it is possible to ensure that subjects fully
expect the actual price shifts ðas in the store vs. restaurant exampleÞ.
We now turn to the case in which price expectations are present. While
in many cases reasonable proxies for price expectations can be found, we
focus on the most conservative case in which the researcher cannot ob-
serve them. This is the case of scenario 2. Now the location of the refer-
ence price is not known, which makes it difﬁcult to control the salience
ranking of speciﬁc goods. This makes testing our model more difﬁcult.
However, proposition 6 provides a clue on how the demand for quality q
depends on its price p, given an arbitrary expected price pe : the demand
for quality is inverse-U-shaped in the sense that a good’s valuation is max-
imized when current prices are close to expected prices ðand quality is
salientÞ and is lower otherwise ðwhen price is salientÞ.21 In the simple case
of pairwise choice, this behavior leads to the testable prediction 2.
21 In particular, an increase in the observed price levels increases the salience of price
provided that observed prices are at or above the expected prices. This is the case in the
Hastings and Shapiro example of demand for gas, where expected prices are known ðthey
are speciﬁed to be the past-period pricesÞ and price shifts are deﬁned relative to expecta-
tions. However, if observed prices are low relative to expectations, then a price hike boosts
the relative salience of quality by bringing observed prices closer to expected prices. Thus,
if expectations are known ðas in scenario 1Þ but do not necessarily coincide with observed
prices ðas in scenario 2Þ, the model has further testable predictions.
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Prediction 2. Suppose that the choice set consists of two goods
ðN 5 2Þ, with q1 < q2 and p1 < p2, and that the expected prices are ﬁxed
but not observed. Under uniform price shifts, pk → pk 1 Dp for k 5 1, 2
and Dp > 0, there can be at most two changes in pairwise choice. If there
exist price shifts Dpa < Dpb < Dpc such that good 1 is chosen at prices pk
1 Dpa and pk 1 Dpc but good 2 is chosen at prices pk 1 Dpb , then good 1
is chosen at any price level pk 1 Dp satisfying Dp ∈ ½0;Dpa  or Dp ≥ Dpc.
As a function of the price level, the quality of the chosen good is either
ﬂat ðif the same good is chosen under all salience rankingsÞ, monotonic,
or inverse-U-shaped ðthe case considered in the predictionÞ. Prediction 2
can be interpreted as describing preference reversals between two goods
within arbitrary choice sets. In this sense, data on consumers’ full pref-
erence rankings, rather than simply choice, provide a better test of the
model when expectations are not observed.
VI. Misleading Sales
To illustrate how our model can clarify ﬁeld evidence on context effects,
we develop an application to sales. Retailers frequently resort to sales
events as a means to sell their products. In 1988, sales accounted for over
60 percent of department store volume ðOrtmeyer et al. 1991Þ. The stan-
dard explanation for sales is price discrimination: sporadic sales allow re-
tailers to lure low-willingness-to-pay customers, whereas high-willingness-
to-pay customers who cannot wait for a sale buy at the higher regular
prices ðVarian 1980; Sobel 1984; Lazear 1986Þ. It is probably true that low-
willingness-to-pay customers tend to sort into sales events, but the high
frequency and predictability of sales cast some doubt on the universal va-
lidity of the price discrimination hypothesis. In particular, there is some
concern that retailers may deliberately inﬂate regular prices in order to
lure consumers into artiﬁcial sales events. The Pennsylvania Bureau of
Consumer Protection has successfully pursued retailers for advertising
misleading sales prices. In Massachusetts, regulatory changes have tight-
ened rules for price comparison claims, for example, requiring that retail
catalogues state that the “original” price is a reference price and not nec-
essarily the previous selling price.
In this section we show that salience—and in particular the logic of
decoy effects—can shed light on these “misleading sales” events. We
highlight two new predictions of our salience-based model of sales:
• In a store selling different qualities, misleading sales boost demand
only for high-quality goods, and this occurs at the expense of de-
mand for lower-quality goods.
• Misleading sales boost demand only for nonstandard goods.
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Speciﬁcally, suppose that a consumer is considering whether or not
to buy a good of quality q and price p in a store. The good is nonstan-
dard in the sense that it has no substitutes and is available only at this
store; we later consider the case of standard goods, which can be easily
found at different stores. The choice set faced by the consumer is C0 ;
fð0; 0Þ; ðq; pÞg, where ð0, 0Þ is the outside option of not buying the good.
In this case, the consumer’s valuation of the good is rational, and the
maximum price he can be charged for the good is his true valuation,
namely, p 5 q.
Suppose now that there is a sale event in the store. By a sale event we
mean that, with some probability p, the consumer is offered a given qual-
ity q at the sale price ps rather than at the full regular price pf > ps. Since
the consumer has rational expectations regarding the possibility of sales,
his expected price is E½p5 pps 1 ð12 pÞpf . When deciding whether or
not to buy the good, this expected price becomes part of the consumer’s
choice context, Csale ; fð0; 0Þ; ðq; psÞ; ðq; E½pÞg.
Consider the standing of the option ðq; psÞ in the new choice context
Csale. The salience of quality is jðq; 2q=3Þ, while the salience of price is
jðps ; ðE½p1 psÞ=3Þ. The central implication is that the retailer can ma-
nipulate the salience of price by manipulating the price discount ps=pf .
In particular, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The retailer can charge a sale price equal to the con-
sumer’s maximum willingness to pay, ps 5 q=d, by setting the full price in
the interval pf ∈ ðq=d; q=d  ð72 2pÞ=ð22 2pÞÞ.
By artiﬁcially inﬂating the regular price of the good and by offering at
the same time a generous discount, the retailer can extract up to the max-
imum consumer valuation q=d. The reason is that the consumer views the
discount as a good deal, boosting his valuation of quality. This mislead-
ing sales logic suggests that ﬁrms generate most returns during the sales
events themselves, consistent with Ortmeyer et al. ð1991Þ. This is in con-
trast with psychological models of sales based on loss aversion ðe.g., Heid-
hues and Koszegi 2008Þ, where ﬁrms make money on sales at regular
prices, and sales events are used as a potentially unproﬁtable bait to gen-
erate loss aversion in consumers.
We now examine the robustness of this sales mechanism to the spec-
iﬁcation of the choice set. In particular, we consider the case in which
the outside option is a different good, with positive quality and price.
This leads us to our ﬁrst prediction, namely, that a “misleading sale” is
effective only for a high-quality good.
Suppose that the store has a high-quality good h 5 ðqh; phÞ and a lower-
quality good l 5 ðql ; plÞ, where qh > ql and ph > pl . For the sake of illus-
tration, we assume that the prices pl and ph at which these goods are sold
are exogenously ﬁxed ðe.g., by the producerÞ. The store, however, can try
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to inﬂuence which good is sold by adopting a misleading sales policy.
In the case of the high-quality good, this amounts to making the good
occasionally available ðsay, with probability 12 pÞ also at a full price
pfh > ph. Similarly, for the low-quality good, the store can set a full price
pfl ∈ ðpl ; phÞ with the same probability.
Proposition 8. Let qh 2 dph > ql 2 dpl and dqh 2 ph < dql 2 pl , so that
when goods are at “sale” prices pl and ph, good h is sold if and only if it
is quality salient. Then
i. regardless of the consumer’s choice in the absence of a sale, the
retailer can sell good h by holding a sale on it where the full price
pfh is suitably chosen;
ii. if the consumer chooses h in the absence of a sale, there exists
no full price pfl ∈ ðpl ; phÞ for l that makes h price salient, and l be
chosen, in the context of the sale.
It is always possible to engineer sales inducing the salient thinker to
overvalue the high-quality good h relative to l, but not the reverse. The
same mechanism underlying the asymmetry of the decoy effect is at
work here since the high regular price effectively acts as a decoy. Hold-
ing a sale on the good with the lowest quality/price ratio unambiguously
decreases the quality/price ratio of the reference good. This effect re-
inforces the salience of quality for the high-quality good and the salience
of price for the low-quality good ðsince price is its relative advantageÞ,
increasing the relative overvaluation of the former.
Our novel prediction on the asymmetry in the effectiveness of sales—
as well as the implication that demand for the high-quality good grows
at the expense of that for the low-quality competitor—has also been
documented in the ﬁeld. In their review on the literature on promo-
tions, Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox ð1995Þ present this asymmetry as one
of the stylized facts in the ﬁeld of marketing.
Consider now our second prediction, namely, that sales are unlikely to
work with standard goods, for which market prices are well known. A
consumer wishes to purchase a standard good of quality q, for instance,
ametro ticket. There areN > 1 potential sellers of the good. Suppose that
each of these sellers implements the same misleading sales policy con-
sisting of a regular price pf and a sale price ps , each occurring with prob-
ability p5 1=2, and where pf =ps 5 k ∈ ð1; 6Þ ðsee proposition 7 aboveÞ.
In this case, the consumer’s choice context consists of 2N goods ðtwo
goods for each of the N salesÞ and the outside option of not buying ð0, 0Þ.
Formally, Csale is given by fð0; 0Þ; ðq; psÞ; : : : ; ðq; E½pÞg, where ðq; psÞ and
ðq;2E½pÞ are repeated N times, and E½p5 ps  ð11 kÞ=2. For the items
on sale, then, the salience of quality is jðq; q½2N =ð2N 1 1ÞÞ, and that of
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price is jðps; ps ½N  ð31 kÞ=2=ð2N 1 1ÞÞ. Owing to homogeneity of de-
gree zero, these expressions imply that when the number of sellers is suf-
ﬁciently large, namely, when
N >
21
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
31 k
p
k 2 1
;
the items on sale have salient price, that is,
j

q; q
2N
2N 1 1

< j

ps ; ps
N  ð31 kÞ=2
2N 1 1

;
rather than salient quality as in the nonstandard good case of proposi-
tion 7.
This result is intuitive and holds for any magnitude k and frequency
p of the sale. As the number of sellers N increases, the average quality
q 5 q½2N =ð2N 1 1Þ in the choice set gets arbitrarily close to the quality q
of the standard good. As a result, quality becomes nonsalient. By contrast,
the price variability generated by sales renders prices salient, increasing
the consumer’s price sensitivity above its rational counterpart. As a re-
sult, when deciding where to buy a standard good, the salient thinker
focuses on price because price is the attribute that varies most across sell-
ers ðalmost by deﬁnition of standard goodsÞ! This implies that a general-
ized policy of misleading sales does not work in the case of standard
goods: because the inherent price variation induces consumers to focus
on prices, the sales event reduces their willingness to pay, so that the over-
all demand for the standard good falls.
VII. Conclusion
We combine two ideas to explain a wide range of experimental and ﬁeld
evidence regarding individual choice, as well as to make new predictions.
The ﬁrst idea is that choices are made in context and that, in partic-
ular, goods are evaluated by comparison with other goods the decision
maker is thinking about. This idea is intimately related to Kahneman
and Tversky’s ð1979Þ concept of reference points and is also central to re-
lated studies of choice by Tversky and Kahneman ð1991Þ, Tversky and Si-
monson ð1993Þ, Bodner and Prelec ð1994Þ, andKoszegi andRabin ð2006Þ.
In ourmodel, context is often determined by the choice set itself, and the
reference good relative to which the options are evaluated has the aver-
age characteristics of all the goods in the choice set. In some examples,
expectations about prices also inﬂuence what decision makers are think-
ing about, and the choice context shaping the reference good is larger
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than the choice set. To discipline the model, we assume that price expec-
tations are rational, but this assumption may need to be revised in some
applications.
The second idea, which extends our earlier work on choice under risk
ðBordalo et al. 2012Þ, holds that the salience of each good’s attributes
relative to the reference good, such as its quality and price, determines
the attention the decision maker pays to these attributes as well as their
weight in his decision. We argue that ordering and diminishing sensitiv-
ity are the two critical properties of salience that together help account
for a broad range of evidence.
We show that our model provides new insight into several puzzles of
consumer choice. The model makes stark predictions for choice in ex-
perimental settings, in which the choice context is fully controlled by the
experimenter. By showing how irrelevant alternatives change the refer-
ence good—and thus the salient attributes of existing alternatives—the
model accounts for two well-known violations of independence of irrele-
vant alternatives, namely, decoy and compromise effects. But our mech-
anism also makes a novel prediction that decoy and compromise effects
are asymmetric in that they differentially beneﬁt more extreme goods
ðe.g., expensive, high-quality goodsÞ, a prediction that has strong exper-
imental support. In the design of desirable goods, the model predicts a
preference for some specialization as long as a minimum balance across
attributes is provided.
By allowing expected prices to shape the reference good, themodel has
stark implications for responses to price changes. Consistent with previ-
ous research, salient thinkers may exhibit lower price sensitivity when
price levels are high, but only when the high price level is fully expected.
In contrast, the model makes the novel prediction that surprising price
increases increase price sensitivity. In particular, the model accounts for
context-dependent willingness to pay, exempliﬁed by Thaler’s celebrated
beer example. Taken together, these predictions suggest that the salience
mechanism can be seen as a simpler alternative to loss aversion in gen-
erating context effects.
We show how these results provide a uniﬁed way of thinking about
ﬁeld evidence previously described asmental accounting, in particular, de-
scribe how consumers react to changes in the prices of individual goods
or whole categories of goods. We provide a novel explanation of Hastings
and Shapiro’s empirical ﬁnding that consumers substitute toward lower-
quality gasoline when all gas prices rise while at the same time accounting
for instances in which consumers substitute toward higher-quality goods
when prices rise ðe.g., the wine exampleÞ. We also present a new theory
of sales based on the idea that the original prices of goods put on sale
serve as decoys that attract consumers to these goods. Our approach, un-
like the standard model of sales, explains why ﬁrms often try to put goods
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on sale immediately after offering them ﬁrst, so that “original” prices are
in effect reference prices and not the previous selling price ðleading to
conﬂict with regulatorsÞ. It also generates new predictions, such as that a
store selling different qualities would put only high-quality goods on sale
and that sales are most effective in boosting demand for nonstandard
goods. We have noted throughout the paper a number of possible exten-
sions and empirical tests, which we leave to future work.
Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The salience of k’s quality is jðqk ; qÞ, while the salience of price is jðpk ; pÞ. Sup-
pose that statement 1 holds so that jðqk ; qÞ > jðpk ; pÞ if and only if qk=pk > q=p,
namely, qk=q > pk=p. Consider the implications for jðqk ; qÞ. For any given values
of pk , p, the condition jðqk ; qÞ5 jðpk ; pÞ is invariant under scaling of qk and q, as
it depends only on the ratio qk=q. As a result, jðqk ; qÞ must depend only on this
ratio and must be proportional to jðqk=q; 1Þ. Setting qk 5 q shows that the pro-
portionality constant is one.
Suppose now that statement 2 holds. Then jðqk ; qÞ5 jðqk=q; 1Þ and jðpk ; pÞ5
jðpk=p; 1Þ, where both qk=q and pk=p are larger than one. By the ordering prop-
erty of salience, then, quality is salient if and only if qk=q > pk=p. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a rational indifference curve characterized by uðq; pÞ5 q 2 p 5 u. As
in the text, order the elements of the choice set by increasing quality and price,
so that ðq1; p1Þ is the cheapest good. The goods’ quality/price ratios satisfy qi=pi
5 11 ðu=piÞ, and in particular, the reference good ðq; pÞ satisﬁes q=p 5 11 ðu=pÞ.
As in the text, we assume that ðq; pÞ is not in the choice set.
1. q1=p1 > 1 when u > 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is decreasing as
price increases, and price is salient for all goods. The reason is that price is the
relative advantage of cheap goods ðwhose prices are under p and have high qual-
ity/price ratiosÞ, while it is the relative disadvantage of expensive goods ðwhose
prices are under p and have low quality/price ratiosÞ. Since the cheapest good is
the best option along the salient price dimension, it is chosen and k* 5 1. For-
mally, all goods are undervalued, uSðqi ; piÞ5 2ðdqi 2 piÞ=ðd1 1Þ, but the cheapest
good is the least undervalued.
2. q1=p1 < 1 when u < 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is increasing as
price increases, and quality is salient for all goods. Since the most expensive
good is the best option along the salient quality dimension, it is chosen and k*
5 N . Formally, all goods are overvalued, uSðqi ; piÞ5 2ðqi 2 dpiÞ=ð11 dÞ, but the
highest-quality good is the most overvalued.
3. q1=p1 5 1 when u 5 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is constant along
the indifference curve. Quality and price are equally salient for all goods. The
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salient thinker evaluates each good correctly ðas the rational agentÞ and is in-
different between them. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a set of goods ðqk ; pkÞk51; : : : ;N that lie on a rational indifference curve,
qk 2 pk 5 u. Let ðq; pÞ be the average quality and price in this set. The full choice
set is ðqk ; pkÞk50; : : : ;N , which includes the outside option ðq0; p0Þ5 ð0; 0Þ. The ref-
erence good has quality q  N =ðN 1 1Þ and price p  N =ðN 1 1Þ. While the qual-
ity/price ratio of the reference good is the same as in the absence of the outside
option, namely, q=p, the reduction in the reference levels of quality and price may
shift the location of the reference relative to some goods ðof intermediate quality
and priceÞ. This would affect the valuation of such goods and possibly the salient
thinker’s choice. We distinguish three cases.
1. q1=p1 < 1 when u < 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is increasing as
price increases, for k ≥ 1 ðrecall that quality and price are increasing in the index
kÞ. Then the highest-quality good ðqN ; pN Þ is quality salient since it has above-
average quality and an above-average quality/price ratio. This implies that it is
overvalued relative to, and thus preferred to, all other goods k < N ðregardless of
the salience rankings of the latterÞ. The condition qN =pN > d ensures that good
ðqN ; pN Þ is also preferred to the outside option ð0, 0Þ.
2. q1=p1 > 1 when u > 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is decreasing as
price increases, for k ≥ 1. Before exploring the salience rankings of the goods in
the choice set, we outline the implications for choice. Suppose ﬁrst that all goods
have salient prices. Then good ðq1; p1Þ is overvalued relative to the other available
goods k ≥ 2, and the condition q1=p1 > 1=d ensures that it is preferred over the
outside option as well. Now suppose that there are some goods whose quality
is salient, and let good ðqk ; pkÞ be the highest-quality good among them. Then
ðqk ; pkÞ is overvalued relative to all other options, including the outside option,
and is chosen ðrecall that qk 2 pk 5 u > 0Þ. Intuitively, because the reference good
lies “below” the rational indifference curve, ðq 2 pÞ  N =ðN 1 1Þ < u, goods that
are quality salient have a price similar to that of the reference good but a higher
quality. Formally, such goods satisfy qk=pk > q=p and qk  pk > q  p  N 2=ðN 1 1Þ2
and, in particular, have a higher quality/price ratio than the reference good.
3. q1=p1 5 1 when u 5 0, in which case the quality/price ratio is the same for all
k ≥ 1. In particular, the reference good lies on the rational indifference curve, so
that all goods have the same quality/price ratio and—as in the absence of the
outside option—quality and price are equally salient for all goods. Because val-
uation is not distorted, the consumer is indifferent between the goods in the
choice set. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
A sufﬁcient condition for reversal between l and h is that good h is chosen if and
only if its relative advantage, namely quality, is salient. This means that qh 2 dph
> ql 2 dpl and also dql 2 pl > dqh 2 ph . The ﬁrst expression yields Du > 2ð12
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dÞðph 2 plÞ and the second yields Du < ð12 dÞðqh 1 qlÞ, where Du 5 ðqh 2 qlÞ2
ðph 2 plÞ.
Consider case i. Since ql=pl > qh=ph , so that good h has a relatively low quality/
price ratio, price is salient in fl, hg and l is chosen. If adding the decoy d to the
choice set makes h quality salient, then the latter is preferred to l in fl,h,dg. Good
h becomes quality salient in several different regimes: ðaÞ if h has high quality
and a high quality/price ratio relative to the reference good, qh=ph > q=p, qh > q
and ph > p; ðbÞ if h dominates the reference good, with higher quality and lower
price, qh  ph > q  p and qh > q, ph < p; ðcÞ if h has low quality and a low quality/
price ratio relative to the reference good, qh=ph < q=p and qh < q, ph < p; and ðdÞ if
h is dominated by the reference good, with lower quality and higher price, qh
ph < q  p and qh < q, ph > p.
We are mainly interested in regime a, in which the decoy is located close to the
other goods, that is, q < qh and p < ph , and it is a “bad deal”; that is, it has a low
quality/price ratio. In this regime the condition that h has a quality/price ratio
above the reference good is
qd
pd
<
qh
ph
1
pl
pd

qh
ph
2
ql
pl

:
We can write this as
qd < pd
qh
ph
1 pl

qh
ph
2
ql
pl

:
So the upper boundary for d has slope qh=ph but is shifted downward by a factor
proportional to qh=ph 2 ql=pl . In particular,
qd
pd
<
qh
ph
<
ql
pl
:
ðBoth regimes a and b impose upper bounds on qd . In regime b, qd < qh , p > ph
and the condition on qh  ph yields qd < qhð3ph=p 2 1Þ2 ql . Regimes c and d instead
impose lower bounds on qd .Þ
In regime a, h is quality salient, which guarantees that it is preferred to l. To
see that alternative d is never chosen, two cases are distinguished: either d has
higher quality and a lower quality/price ratio than h, in which case it is price
salient; or it has lower quality and a lower quality/price ratio than h, in which case
either it can be dominated ðqd < qh and pd > phÞ or not. In either case, by being
quality salient, h is overvalued relative to d. Thus, a small enough d can be found
such that h is chosen. A sufﬁcient condition for h to be chosen, for any d, is that
the decoy lies on a lower rational indifference curve than h. This is guaranteed
for dominated d and by continuity for some d with qd > qh as well. In fact, this
holds for all decoys in regime a.
Consider now case ii. Since ql=pl < qh=ph , so that good h has a relatively high
quality/price ratio, quality is salient in fl,hg and h is chosen. Given the constraints
q < qh and p < ph , adding a decoy d to the choice set makes h price salient when
salience and consumer choice 837
it increases the quality/price ratio of the average good to the level where qh=ph
< q=p. However, this is excluded by the condition that the decoy is a “bad deal,”
namely, qd=pd <maxfql=pl ; qh=phg. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that the prices of all goods in CC are shifted by a small g > 0. Then the
average price in C shifts by h  g, where h is the share of goods in CC. Consider the
salience of price for goods in CC that have price p*, that is, jðp* 1 g; p 1 hgÞ. Di-
minishing sensitivity implies that salience decreases in g whenever h5 1 or when
h < 1 but p* < p. The reason is that in either situation the average payoff level in-
creases but the difference between payoffs weakly decreases.
For salience to increase in g, it is necessary that the difference in payoffs in-
creases as well, so that the ordering property of salience may dominate over di-
minishing sensitivity. A necessary condition for salience to increase is thus that
h < 1 and p* > p. The precise trade-off between payoff level and payoff differ-
ence ði.e., between diminishing sensitivity and orderingÞ is not pinned down by
the properties of salience considered in deﬁnition 1. However, assuming homo-
geneity of degree zero, we get that
ygjðp* 1 g; p 1 hgÞ > 0⇔ yg p
* 1 g
p 1 hg
> 0:
Replacing p* with pmaxC , we get the condition in the proposition. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
The average quality in Ccont is q 5 ð2=3Þ  q. The average price is p 5 ð1=3Þðp
1 E½pjjÞ. Thus, the salience of quality and price of good ðq, pÞ are, respectively,
j

1;
2
3

; j

1;
1
3

11
E½pjj
p

:
It follows that quality is salient when
p ∈

E½pjj  2
7
; E½pjj

or E½pjj ∈

p;
7p
2

:
Note that as p varies in this range, it can take values larger or smaller than the
reference price p. In turn, price is salient when
E½pjj < p and E½pjj > 7p
2
:
Recall the deﬁnition of willingness to pay:
WTPðqjðq;E½pjjÞÞ5 supp
subject to uSððq; pÞjðq; E½pjjÞÞ ≥ uSðð0; 0Þjðq;E½pjjÞÞ:
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Consider ﬁrst the case in which the good is expensive relative to the reference
price, E½pjj < p. Then price is salient, so the consumer buys the good if and only if
its discounted quality is sufﬁciently high, dq ≥ p. Thus, WTP5 dq whenever
E½pjj < dq.
Consider now the case in which quality is salient, so the good is cheaper than
the reference price, E½pjj ≥ p, but the price is not too low. If quality is salient, the
consumer buys the good as long as its inﬂated quality is above its price, q=d ≥ p.
Thus, price can be jacked up all the way to q=d as long as it does not change the sa-
lience ranking:WTP5maxfq=d; E½pjjg. As a consequence, for E½pjj ≤ q=d, WTP
5 E½pjj. For 7q=2d > E½pjj > q=d, we ﬁnd WTP5 q=d.
Finally, consider the case E½pjj > 7q=2d. Now the reference price is so high
that even at the highest possible price for the good, namely q=d, its price is sa-
lient. As a result, WTP goes back down to dq. QED
Proof of Prediction 1
Under the “if” step of the prediction, the consumer’s choice changes from i to j
as prices increase in parallel. This implies that ðaÞ there is a shift in the salience
ranking of at least one of the goods i and j, which beneﬁts the valuation of j
relative to i, and ðbÞ the shift in salience rankings is sufﬁcient to change the con-
sumer’s choice. Because expected prices coincide with observed prices, diminish-
ing sensitivity implies that under a price increase, any shift in salience ranking is
a shift from price to quality salience.22 Since qj > qi , that is, demand for quality in-
creases with price level, it must be that good j becomes quality salient and, thus,
overvalued relative to good i.
Turning to the “then” step of the prediction, note that because pi < p0 < pj ,
uniformly increasing the prices of all other goods k  i, j such that the resulting
reference price equals pj results in good j being strictly quality salient while
strictly increasing the salience of price for good i ðthus precluding the case in
which good i goes from being price salient to quality salientÞ. As a consequence,
under the new price distribution, good j is preferred over good i so that good
i is no longer chosen. Yet the characteristics of goods i and j have not changed,
and the other goods have become more expensive. This is a violation of the
axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. QED
Proof of Prediction 2
We begin with two observations. First, as observed prices uniformly shift by Dp,
the reference price shifts by Dp=2, so that this process typically affects the salience
rankings of the two goods. In particular, if the observed price of a good becomes
very different from the expected price ðeither very low or very highÞ, price might
become salient. If instead the actual price is close to the expected price, then
quality is salient. Thus, as both goods’ prices increase by Dp, a given good’s sa-
22 Without loss of generality, we ignore the nongeneric case of equal salience of price
and quality, as well as the case in which qj 5 q. The argument carries through to these cases
as well.
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lience ranking follows ða subset ofÞ the chain P → Q → P , where P and Q repre-
sent price and quality salience, respectively. As a consequence, the set of transi-
tions of salience rankings of the two goods as both goods’ observed prices uni-
formly increase are described by ða subset ofÞ one of the following chains:
PP → QP → fPP or QQg→ PQ → PP ; ðA1Þ
PP → PQ → fPP or QQg→ QP → PP : ðA2Þ
Here the ﬁrst letter denotes the salient attribute of good 1 and the second letter
denotes the salient attribute of good 2. Not all possible rankings necessarily ob-
tain. In particular, it may be impossible to have both goods be quality salient if
their prices are too far apart.23
Our second observation is that the set of possible salience rankings can be or-
dered in terms of the difference in valuation between the lower-quality good and
the high-quality good. Write DvXY as the difference in valuation of good 1 versus
good 2 when good 1’s attribute X is salient and good 2’s attribute Y is salient:
DvXY 5
ðq1 2 q2Þ2 dðp1 2 p2Þ XY 5 QQ
ðq1 2 dq2Þ2 ðdp1 2 p2Þ XY 5 QP
ðdq1 2 q2Þ2 ðp1 2 dp2Þ XY 5 PQ
dðq1 2 q2Þ2 ðp1 2 p2Þ XY 5 PP :
8><
>>:
For example, the overvaluation of good 1 is larger when the salience rankings are
QP than when they are QQ , namely, DvQP > DvQQ . We can check that, under the
quality and price rankings of goods 1 and 2, the relative valuations satisfy DvQP
> DvQQ > DvPP > DvPQ .
When the two observations are put together, only a certain set of shifts in de-
mand for quality can occur under parallel price shifts. For instance, if DvPQ > 0,
then good 1 is chosen under any salience ranking, so that the consumer chooses
good 1 at any price ðwe say that demand for quality is ﬂat as a function of price
levelsÞ. Similarly, if DvQP < 0, good 2 is always chosen. If DvPQ < 0 < DvQP , then
demand for quality along the entire chains ðA1Þ and ðA2Þ is single-peaked, namely,
of the form 1→ 2 → 1 or 2 → 1→ 2. However, if only a subset of these chains
obtain under parallel price shifts with Dp ≥ 2p2, then demand may be monotonic
ðor even ﬂatÞ. Because salience rankings are not observable, such restrictions are
not predictable ex ante. Therefore, the testable prediction is that, if two changes
in preferences have been observed between p0 1 Dp1 and p0 1 Dp2 and between
p0 1 Dp2 and p0 1 Dp3, then there are no other preference changes at other price
levels: demand for quality is constant ðand equalÞ forDp ∈ ½2p2;Dp1 andDp > Dp3.
Note that if the observer has some information about the expected prices,
then further predictions can be made. Suppose that the expected prices satisfy
23 Moreover, the endpoints of the chain may not obtain either. For instance, as Dp be-
comes large, the salience of each good’s price approaches jðDp;Dp=2Þ. If the salience func-
tion is homogeneous of degree zero, this equals a ﬁnite number, so that quality might be
salient in this limit. Also, in each chain’s middle step, either PP or QQ obtains, but not both.
840 journal of political economy
pe < p2 2
p1 2 p2
2
: ðA3Þ
In this case, the lower-quality good costs more than the reference price
ðpe 1 p0Þ=2, so any increase in the observed prices boosts the price salience of both
goods. Moreover, since p1 > p2, ordering implies that jðp1; pÞ > jðp2; pÞ, while di-
minishing sensitivity ðtogether with the assumption that expected qualities coin-
cide with observed qualitiesÞ implies that jðq1; qÞ < jðq2; qÞ. As a consequence, if
the low-quality good is price salient, then so is the high-quality good. Conversely,
still assuming that ðA3Þ holds, if the high-quality good is quality salient, so is the
low-quality good. These considerations restrict the possible salience rankings to
the subset QQ → PQ → PP of chain ðA1Þ. In this case, suppose that under a price
increase there is an increase in demand for quality. This means that both goods
are price salient—we are in the rightmost PP step of chain ðA1Þ—and there are no
further shifts in demand for higher price levels. Alternatively, suppose that under
a price drop respecting ðA3Þ there is an increase in demand for quality. This means
that both goods are quality salient—we are in theQQ step of chain ðA1Þ—and price
cannot go lower without violating ðA3Þ. QED
Proof of Proposition 7
As in the text, consider the choice context Csale given by fð0; 0Þ; ðq; psÞ; ðq; E½pÞg.
Consider the valuation of the good on sale, ðq; psÞ. The salience of its quality is
ðusing homogeneity of degree zeroÞ jðq; 2q=3Þ5 jð1; 2=3Þ. The salience of its
price is
j

ps ;
ps 1 E½p
3

5 j

1;
11 ðE½p=psÞ
3

:
Therefore, quality is more salient than price as long as
pf
ps
∈

1;
72 2p
22 2p

:
In fact, if pf is much higher than ps , then the price difference among them be-
comes salient again. For ratios pf =ps at which quality is salient, the willingness
to pay is ps 5 q=d, from which the result follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 8
The store can always make the high-quality good quality salient by holding a sale
with a full price pf h 5 ð42 pÞph 2 2pl ðin which case ph coincides with the ex-
pected quality in the choice context, E½pÞ.
Instead, by holding a sale on the low-quality good, the store lowers the quality/
price ratio of the reference good. As long as pf l < ph , this makes it easier for h to
be quality salient as it has both higher quality and price and also a higher qual-
ity/price ratio compared to the reference good. In particular, if in the absence of
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a sale h is quality salient and is chosen by the consumer, holding the sale for l has
no effect on the consumer’s choice. QED
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